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Abstract
Domestic public debt issued by emerging markets has risen signiﬁcantly relative to international
debt in recent years. Some recent empirical evidence also suggests that sovereigns have defaulted
differentially on debt held by domestic and external creditors. Standard models of sovereign debt,
however, mainly focus on how the actions of foreign creditors inﬂuence default decisions of
sovereigns. Contrasting this one-sided focus, this paper adds to a new theoretical literature that
points at the possibility of default on domestic debt and the consequences of doing so. It presents
a model of an emerging market economy in which the government can selectively default on its
domestic or external debt obligations. The model shows that the differential ability of domestic
and foreign creditors to punish the government creates a gap in the expected default costs to the
sovereign, and hence a differential in its propensity to default on its domestic versus foreign debt.
The extent to which the possibility of differential treatment of creditors affects the composition of
debt is explored. It shows that a country characterized by volatile output, sovereign risk, and
costly tax collection will want to borrow in domestic markets as well as in international capital
markets. The optimal allocation of debt between domestic and foreign creditors can thus be
viewed as the government’s purchase of insurance against macroeconomic shocks that affect its
budget.
JEL classiﬁcation: F30, H21, H63
Bank classiﬁcation: Debt management; International topics
Résumé
L’encours de la dette intérieure des économies émergentes a sensiblement augmenté ces dernières
années par rapport à celui de leur dette extérieure. De récents travaux empiriques tendent aussi à
indiquer que les débiteurs souverains n’honorent pas leurs engagements à l’endroit de leurs
créanciers nationaux de la même façon qu’envers leurs créanciers internationaux. Dans les
modèles habituels de la dette souveraine, toutefois, les chercheurs s’attachent surtout à déterminer
comment les actions des créanciers étrangers inﬂuent sur la décision des États de respecter ou non
leurs obligations. En contraste avec cette approche unidimensionnelle, l’auteure inscrit son étude
dans un nouveau courant théorique qui s’intéresse à la possibilité de défaillance à l’égard de la
dette intérieure et à ses implications. Elle présente le modèle d’un pays à marché émergent dont le
gouvernement peut choisir de ne pas assurer le service de sa dette intérieure ou extérieure. Selon
ce modèle, l’aptitude inégale des créanciers résidents et non résidents à sanctionner l’État
défaillant explique l’écart observé entre les coûts de défaut attendus pour le débiteur souverain et,iv
par conséquent, la propension de ce dernier à privilégier l’une ou l’autre catégorie de ses
créanciers. L’auteure tente d’évaluer si la différence de traitement à laquelle seraient soumis les
créanciers inﬂue sur la structure de la dette. Elle montre qu’un pays qui se caractérise par une
production très variable, un risque souverain et des coûts de perception élevés des impôts
préférera emprunter à la fois sur son propre marché et sur les marchés ﬁnanciers internationaux.
La répartition optimale des emprunts entre prêteurs résidents et non résidents peut donc être
assimilée à la souscription par l’État d’une police d’assurance contre les chocs
macroéconomiques susceptibles de frapper son budget.
Classiﬁcation JEL : F30, H21, H63
Classiﬁcation de la Banque : Gestion de la dette; Questions internationales       
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1. Introduction 
  Debt markets in emerging economies have expanded considerably since the mid-1990s. 
Domestic debt securities, in particular, have experienced considerable growth during this period. 
By late 2004, the stock of domestic debt securities issued by emerging economies reporting data 
to the BIS reached US$ 2.8 trillion and was four times larger than the corresponding amount of 
international debt securities (US$ 0.7 trillion). As a proportion of GDP, the stock of domestic 
debt securities issued by emerging markets has almost doubled since the mid-1990s, and stood at 
40 percent in 2004.1 
 
The increasing significance of public sector bonds issued in domestic markets argues for 
the importance of analyzing the considerations that affect a government’s decision to borrow 
from home or abroad. The optimal composition of debt between domestic and external 
components is an issue which has received little attention in the sovereign debt literature. It has 
been argued that the decision of where to issue debt reflects the characteristics of domestic 
capital markets. That is, countries that are characterized by poorly developed capital markets or 
low supply of domestic savings may be forced to borrow in the foreign markets. However, the 
focus of this literature is on why countries may be forced to issue foreign debt when domestic 
capital markets are not well developed. It does not focus on why governments may choose to 
borrow at home (or abroad) when they have the option of issuing debt in either market. This 
paper is an attempt towards providing an explanation for the latter. 
 
This issue is particularly relevant in the light of recent developments in debt markets. 
With the liberalization of capital flows and the increasing sophistication of domestic financial 
markets, developing country residents are buying more and more of their governments’ debt. In 
the event of a debt restructuring, domestic residents figure as borrowers and as creditors, thus 
appearing on both sides of the negotiating table. The tasks of debt restructuring are further 
complicated in today’s emerging market sovereign debt world, as the structure and patterns of 
holding debt instruments becomes increasingly complex. As a result, in contrast to the default 
episodes of the 1980s, the episodes of the 1990s left open many more margins on which a 
country experiencing repayment difficulties had to make decisions. Countries had to decide 
                                                  
1 Source: BIS and IMF        
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which instruments they would default upon. For example, while Argentina and Ecuador 
defaulted on all debt instruments, Russia, Ukraine and Pakistan defaulted on only a few 
instruments. 
 
  Countries also had to decide whether to default on debt held by domestic creditors or on 
that held by foreign creditors. Foreign debt is often taken to be synonymous with foreign-
currency denominated debt, domestic debt with domestic-currency denominated debt. However, 
the currency denomination and the nationality of investors do not necessarily match.2 Indeed, in 
some cases it is difficult to distinguish between domestic and foreign creditors because, with 
highly integrated world capital markets, who ultimately ends up holding the debt is independent 
of where the government issues it. However, as pointed out by Drazen (1998), it is important to 
distinguish between domestic and external debt for two reasons. First, governments face different 
incentives in repaying debts held by residents and nonresidents.
3 Second, governments can 
influence to some extent whether bonds are held by domestic residents or nonresidents. Interest 
differentials can sometimes be observed on identical debt instruments issued at home versus 
abroad. Some debt instruments are clearly segmented in terms of their bearers.4  
 
In addressing the above stated issues, this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 
provides a discussion of the theoretical and empirical motivation for the paper. Section 3 reviews 
the related literature. Section 4 presents the benchmark theoretical model where the government 
                                                  
2 According to the “economic” definition (based on a residency principle), foreign debt is only the debt by non-
residents, regardless of whether the debt is in local or foreign currency, whether it is issued at home or abroad. 
Conversely, domestic debt is debt by residents, regardless of whether the debt is in local or foreign currency, 
whether it is issued at home or abroad. According to the “legal” definition, domestic debt is defined as debt issued 
according to domestic law, regardless of whether it is in local or foreign currency and regardless of who, foreign or 
domestic residents, is holding these claims. Conversely, the “legal” definition of foreign debt i s debt issued 
according to foreign law, regardless of whether it is in local or foreign currency and regardless of who is holding 
these claims. 
3 Kremer and Mehta (2000) note that there is historical evidence that the repayment decisions of sovereigns are 
conditioned on the identity of their creditors. They suggest that “a large amount of domestic-currency-denominated 
foreign debt borne by a government is said to raise suspicions that the government will pursue inflationary policies. 
Thus, speculative attacks against the French franc in the 1920s have been blamed on expectations that the 
government would try to inflate away its foreign debt obligation from World War I.” (Kremer and Mehta (2000), pp 
4) 
4 Governments do issue debt that is differentially targeted to domestic or foreign creditors; for example, many 
countries issue sovereign bonds that are non-transferable or difficult to transfer. Domestic currency denominated 
debt may likewise be more attractive to domestic investors than foreign investors.        
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can credibly commit to repaying its domestic and external obligations. Section 5 focuses on 
incentive problems, and selective default on one class of debt obligations. Section 6 concludes.  
 
2. Motivation 
The motivation for this study is two-fold. The theoretical motivation stems from the fact 
that the vast literature on sovereign debt mostly ignores the distinction between domestic and 
foreign borrowing, with most papers addressing only external debt.
5 Furthermore, most studies 
of sovereign external debt assume that the capacity to raise foreign exchange is the binding 
constraint in the sovereign’s repayment decision. On the other hand, several authors have 
focused on the fiscal constraint, recognizing that the repayment of foreign debt- which is 
primarily owed by the government- is financed by the transfer of resources from the private to 
the public sector.
6 This paper focuses on the second approach. To these fiscal constraints, this 
paper adds another crucial element: the service of the domestic debt. This is done by focusing on 
the problem of raising domestic revenue through distortionary taxation in order to service 
government debt obligations. Governments need to make adjustments on both the external and 
domestic fronts in order to service their external debt obligations. The external adjustment 
involves running a trade surplus by subsidizing exports, rationing of imports, and real 
devaluations. The domestic adjustment requires raising taxes and incurring the social cost of 
distortionary taxation required for servicing the debt. If this ‘secondary burden’ of raising taxes 
is not borne, then domestic debt will simply replace external debt over time. This, in turn, could 
have serious repercussions for the economy (Cohen, 1987).  
 
Another strand of literature that this study draws on is the optimal taxation approach 
towards debt management. In recent years, research on debt management has made significant 
progress, focusing on debt structure by denomination, indexation features and maturity, with the 
results relying heavily on the optimality of tax smoothing.
7 However, little attention has been 
paid to the question of whether debt should be issued at home or abroad, and the factors that 
influence the choice of borrowing from domestic or foreign markets. This paper uses the optimal 
taxation approach to analyze this issue. The crucial difference, however, between the 
                                                  
5 Exceptions are Cohen (1991), Drazen (1998), and Kremer and Mehta (2000). 
6 Reisen and van Trotsenberg (1988), Easterly (1989), Guidotti and Kumar (1991), and Dooley and Stone (1993). 
7 See Bohn (1988), Calvo (1988), Calvo and Guidotti (1990;1992), Bohn (1990), and de-Fontenay et al. (1995).        
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conventional analysis of optimal taxation and the present model is the introduction of country 
risk considerations. This paper develops a model of segmented markets in which the government 
can selectively default on one class of its obligations (i.e. domestic or foreign), and such default 
is costly. The focus is on the problem of raising domestic revenue in order to service government 
debt obligations. The government is assumed to manage its debt to minimize the expected 
present value of the distortions from financing its expenditures. The ultimate goal of the model is 
to characterize the optimal debt structure chosen by the sovereign. 
 
  Thus, this paper expands the existing literature in two directions. First, it goes beyond 
external debt and explicitly considers the crucial issue of domestic debt service faced by a 
sovereign. Second, it builds on the conventional analysis of optimal taxation by considering the 
possibility of default on domestic and/or external debt. The option of defaulting brings partial 
state contingency to the economy. 
 
The second source of motivation is derived from recent sovereign default episodes, some 
of which clearly highlight a differential treatment between domestic and foreign creditors. In a 
recent paper, Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2004) study whether investors were treated equally 
in recent debt restructurings, or if some instrument holders came out better than others. Their 
main results show that some (but not all) exchanges studied exhibit substantial variations in the 
“haircut” even within the same exchange, depending on the instrument tendered. Thus in most 
cases, “intercreditor equity” was violated ex post, at least in a present value sense. The recent 
default episodes in Argentina and Russia, briefly outlined below, show some interesting patterns 
with regards to the treatment of domestic and foreign bondholders. 
 
Argentina
8    
  In November 2001, after a substantial fall in tax collection, the Finance Minister, 
Domingo Cavallo, announced that he would seek debt relief in a voluntary manner and in two 
stages. The first stage (Phase I) would be targeted at local bondholders, and the second (Phase II) 
at foreigners. Bond prices plummeted soon after this announcement. In the end, Phase I did 
happen but soon thereafter the government was ousted in a civilian coup and decided on a 
                                                  
8 See Sturznegger (2002) for an exhaustive account of recent sovereign defaults.        
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broader default. As a result, Phase II never materialized. The Phase I debt exchange was 
designed to allow local bondholders to swap their bonds for a guaranteed loan governed by 
Argentine law, the guarantee being the resources collected by the financial transaction tax. 
Moreover, local bondholders had the option of recovering the original bonds in the event of any 
change in the terms and conditions of the guaranteed loans. The bond exchange was extremely 
successful with almost all the debt in the hands of banks, local pension funds and local residents 
being tendered. The exchange was aimed at segmenting local and external bondholders, thus 
protecting the local financial institutions and local pension funds by offering them a better debt 
instrument, i.e. a guaranteed loan9. However, the domestic bond exchange was considered a 
technical default by rating agencies, and S&P moved Argentina to the selective default (SD) 
category. 
 
  On December 24, 2001 Argentina announced the suspension of all payments on all debt 
instruments. The default was unique in that all claims were declared in default, even before being 
in default legally. The Argentinean case is also interesting because 60 percent of debt was held 
by Argentines themselves. Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2004) note that “domestic investors 
that tendered their instruments in Argentina’s ‘Phase 1’ exchange did not fare much better on 
average, as they were restructured twice, in November of 2001 and February 2002 (pesification). 





  Russia’s debt situation deteriorated from late 1997 and continued to worsen through 
1998. In order to ease pressures in the GKO market and to reduce interest costs, the government 
announced a large swap of GKOs for Eurobonds in mid-July 1998.
11 On August 17, less than a 
month after the swap was completed, pressures mounted and a default on GKOs was announced. 
That same day the Russian authorities unilaterally declared a moratorium on all ruble-
denominated public debt falling due through the end of 1999. In order to ease the pressures on 
                                                  
9 However, it is not clear whether this guarantee actually had any effect as government debt is always guaranteed by 
tax collection. 
10 Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2004), pp 49. 
11 GKOs were ruble-denominated, short-term treasury bills with maturities of up to twelve months.         
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the exchange rate and the banking system, external debt obligations were subject to a three-
month moratorium. At the time of default, Russia’s public debt stood at less than 60 percent of 
GDP. External debt was about 45 percent of GDP, with Soviet era debt comprising about two-
thirds of this amount. Domestic debt amounted to approximately 15 percent of GDP, consisting 
mostly of short-term GKOs.
12 It is estimated that about Rub 190 billion in GKO/OFZs was 
affected by the restructuring, of which over Rub 80 billion was held by non-residents. 
 
  The actual default in August 1998 was somewhat unique in modern economic history. 
The initial announcement did not include a formal declaration of default on external debts. The 
default on external debt came later, although it was not a surprise, given the poor history of 
repayments.
13 Nevertheless, the key element in the emergency package was a restructuring of 
domestic (ruble) debt. The government’s decision to default was unprecedented and clearly 
controversial, as no country in modern history had ever defaulted on a bond that was 
denominated in its local currency and was subject to its local law. In the past, when faced with a 
similar situation, other countries simply eliminated their domestic currency debt problem by 
printing money, effectively inflating away the issue. The Russian authorities’ motivation for the 
default on domestic debt when other options were available is an open question. One possible 
explanation is an anti-inflationary bias on part of the authorities at the time the decision was 
made.
14 This anti-inflationary bias could possibly have resulted from the prolonged phase of 
economic contraction, high inflation and depreciation that marked the early 1990s. Another 
explanation is that concerns about the lack of private sector involvement in Russia motivated the 
authorities to default on domestic debt obligations.
15 
 
The Russian debt restructuring is an illustration of the sovereign’s tendency of treating 
domestic and external creditors differently. A month after the default, on September 14, the 
                                                  
12 This breakdown between external and domestic debt is based on the currency criterion. 
13 It is important to note that, prior to default, the government had proposed to exchange GKOs owned by non-
residents for 5-yr bonds with interest rates slightly above Libor. The residents would have received 3 -yr Ruble 
bonds with a 30% rate. This dual treatment of the two categories of bondholders was rejected by the IMF as 
discriminatory. 
14 See IMF (2003) 
15 During the time of the Russian default, there was a perception that the private sector had not contributed 
adequately during the Asian crisis. It was believed that the “big packages” from the IMF to Thailand, Indonesia and 
Korea had only served to bail out private investors.        
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central bank issued three short-term zero-coupon bonds (KBOs) which were exchanged for 
frozen GKOs and OFZs held by a small number of Russian banks. These bonds were issued 
without any prior public notification, and violated the sovereign’s previous commitments to 
equal treatment of domestic and foreign investors.
16  
 
  Thus, the default episodes discussed above demonstrate that sovereigns do not 
necessarily default in the same way on debt held by domestic and external creditors. The theory 
in this paper attempts to capture this selectivity by focusing on the distinction between domestic 
and external debt, rather than modeling aggregate public debt. The paper attempts to explore the 
extent to which the possibility of differential treatment of creditors affects the composition of 
sovereign debt. 
 
3. Related Literature 
While the voluminous theoretical literature on sovereign debt focuses on the enforcement 
technology available to foreign creditors, scant attention has been paid to the domestic creditors. 
The distinction between the domestic and external debt obligations of a sovereign has largely 
gone unaddressed. This section briefly outlines some studies that have analyzed this issue. 
 
Cohen (1987) is the first to introduce a distinction between internal and external 
borrowing in order to address the issue of garnering domestic revenue to finance debt repayment. 
The paper compares Brazil’s and Mexico’s adjustment during 1983-85, and concludes that the 
secondary burden of raising domestic taxes was borne by Mexico but not by Brazil. The 
repayment strategy adopted by Brazil during this period resulted in an excessive increase in her 
domestic debt and pushed up the interest rate. However, Cohen’s analysis does not consider the 
possibility of debt repudiation. 
 
Drazen (1998) highlights the role of political determinants, specifically the importance of 
the very different political rights enjoyed by domestic residents versus foreigners, in the decision 
of where to issue debt. The model is one of segmented markets in which the government acts as 
                                                  
16 As documented in Sturzenegger (2002), Russia had signed various investment protection treaties with the US, 
UK, Germany and Netherlands in 1989. These treaties dictated equal treatment of foreign and domestic investments.        
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a discriminating monopsonist in placing its debt, and in which it can selectively repudiate one 
class of its obligations (i.e. domestic or foreign). The government’s decision to repudiate or 
renegotiate its debt depends on the identity of its claimants through the different political rights 
they enjoy, and the punishments they can exact if the government fails to meet its obligations. A 
difference in the political rights of domestic and foreign residents implies that the effective cost 
of borrowing at home and abroad may differ substantially, with the composition of the debt 
reflecting the politically determined terms of borrowing. The two key determinants of 
equilibrium borrowing in Drazen’s model are the level and distribution of income, and the 
severity of penalties for non-repayment. 
 
Kremer and Mehta (2000) examine the effect of reduced transactions costs in the 
international trading of assets on the ability of governments to issue debt. They examine a model 
in which governments care about the welfare of their citizens, and thus are more inclined to 
default if a large proportion of their debt is held by foreigners. They argue that if a government 
faces different groups of potential creditors, and its ability to commit to repay its debt varies 
across those groups, then market exchanges of debt between the groups may make it more 
difficult for the government to commit to repay. Thus, a reduction of transaction costs in asset 
markets may, paradoxically, reduce a government’s ability to commit to repay its debt, worsen 
its terms of credit, and reduce its welfare.  
 
4. The Model  
Consider a two-period model of an emerging market economy with two kinds of public 
debt: Debt held by domestic residents, denoted byB, referred to as ‘domestic debt’ henceforth, 
and debt held by external creditors, denoted byF. Both types of debt are real, i.e. denominated 
in foreign currency. The main focus is on a non-monetary economy, so the composition of public 
debt abstracts from interactions with inflation and monetary policy. Nominal debt and 
inflationary default are not dealt with here. There are three types of agents: domestic consumers 
(bondholders), foreign creditors and the government. The country’s problem is to decide how 
much to borrow from domestic and external markets. 
        
9 
The creditor side of the market consists of many small bondholders. Owing to their large 
number, investors can’t coordinate among themselves. There are restrictions on private domestic 
creditors borrowing and lending abroad, so that government bonds are the only saving vehicle. 
This may approximate the situation in countries with capital controls. We also assume that 
foreigners cannot borrow from or lend to private domestic residents. This assumption captures 
the premise that the government has control over the ownership of debt. The fact that all debt is 
government held can also be explained via sovereign risk. In the context of international lending, 
lenders have very little ability to assess the solvency of an individual private borrower in a 
developing country. Foreign lenders are able to penalize the country as a whole for 
nonrepayment more easily than to impose sanctions on an individual private borrower in that 
country.  Thus foreigners may not lend to the private sector directly but only if the government 
guarantees the debt.  
 
There are two periods. In period 1 the government can choose between various 
combinations of tax and debt financing. In period 2 only taxes are available to finance both debt 
repayments and expenditure on the public good. To simplify the analysis we consider the case 
where the initial outstanding domestic and external debt is zero. Also, the volume of real 
government expenditure is assumed to be exogenous, and thus the present analysis abstracts from 
the choice of the level and composition of government expenditures. 
 
4.1 Domestic Creditors 
The economy is inhabited by a large number of identical individuals. Each individual 
lives for two periods and saves by holding government bonds. Though the government has 
access to foreign financial markets, private agents have access only to the domestic financial 
market in this model.  
 
Individuals derive utility from consumption in both periods as well as from government 
spending,G. However, individuals take fiscal policy as given and thus the amount of public 
good produced is beyond the private sector’s domain. The representative consumer maximizes 
the following intertemporal utility function:   
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with respect to  1 C  and  2 C , where  i C { } 2 , 1 = i  denotes the period  i consumption of the 
representative individual,  and  ) ( i W G  { } 2 , 1 = i  denotes the excess burden of taxation in period  i . 
i G  { } 2 , 1 = i  denotes the volume of real government expenditure, excluding interest payments on 
the public debt, and is assumed to be exogenous. We assume that the utility derived from 
consuming  i C ,  ) ( i C u , is separable from the utility derived from provision of public goods, 
denoted by  ) ( i G v . The utility index  u is assumed to be strictly increasing and  ) 1 , 0 ( ˛ d  is the 
discount factor. The maximization problem is subject to the following budget constraints: 
 
1 1 1 1 1 ) ( S W Y C - G - G - =                      (2) 
 
    ) ( ) 1 ( 2 2 2 1 2 G - G - + + = W Y S r C b                    (3) 
 
where,  1 S  denotes the individual’s savings in the first period,  i G  { } 2 , 1 = i denotes the tax revenue 
obtained by the government in period  i,  i Y { } 2 , 1 = i  is the exogenous income in period  i, and  b r  
is the domestic interest rate. Equations (2) and (3) can be combined into the following 
intertemporal budget constraint: 




































1              (4) 
 
The left-hand side of equation (4) is the present discounted value of consumption. The right-hand 
side is wealth, that is, the present discounted value of the future stream of income minus taxes. 
The discount rate used to calculate the present discounted values is the domestic interest rate. 
 
The representative consumer’s problem is to maximize, with respect to ( 1 C , 2 C ), the 
utility function in equation (1) subject to constraint (4). The first order conditions imply the 
following familiar Euler equation:        
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) ( ' ) 1 ( ) ( ' 2 1 C u r C u b + = d                              (5) 
 
Equations (4) and (5) thus determine the private sector’s intertemporal consumption pattern 
) ( i C as a function of the domestic interest rate and wealth. 
 
4.2 Foreign Creditors 
  The mass of foreign lenders comprises a large number of risk-neutral investors. Two 
assets (with a one-period maturity) are available to these investors: a government bond yielding 
an interest rate of  f r , and the choice to invest in international capital markets and earn the net 
risk-free return denoted by  0
* > r . The international investor’s holdings of government bonds 
and risk-free international assets at period  i are denoted by  i F  and 
*
i x , respectively. Foreign 
creditors are assumed to have perfect information regarding the economy’s endowment process, 
and can observe the endowment levels each period. Since foreign creditors are assumed to be 
risk neutral and perfectly competitive, their profits will be zero in expected terms.  Under 
precommitment, their problem can be characterized as follows: 
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1 F x a c - - =                   (6.1)   
 








0 a  is the initial wealth, and 
*
i c  denotes the consumption of investors in period i. 
 
 
4.3 The Government 
The focus is on a benevolent government which seeks to maximize the welfare of its 
citizens, and which takes account of the impact of taxes on welfare. There is an asymmetry in the 
sovereign borrower’s treatment of domestic and foreign creditors.  Domestic creditors are        
12 
favored in the sense that their welfare figures into the government’s objective function, and 
hence into its repayment decision. Foreign creditors are disfavored in the sense that the effect of 
default on foreign creditors’ welfare does not affect the government’s repayment decision 
directly. The effect of default on foreign debt only figures indirectly as the penalty which 
captures the punishment capability of foreigners.
17  
 
The key idea is that taxes are distortionary and the government minimizes the distortion 
from taxation by allocating taxes over time
18. Let i G  ( ) 2 , 1 = i  be the tax revenue obtained by the 
government in period i. Following Barro (1979), the excess burden or deadweight loss of 
taxation is represented by the loss function  ) ( i W G , where  , 0 ) 0 ( = W   , 0 > ¢ W   0 > ¢ ¢ W .19  Here 
the degree of risk-aversion of taxpayers does not affect the basic intuition that, because of the 
convex excess burden in its objective function, the government should smooth tax rates. Because 
of the nature of the loss function of taxes, the government should act as if it were risk averse, 
even if all the households are risk neutral. Thus, the assumption of risk-neutral residents helps to 
focus on the government’s problem. 
 
4.4 Equilibrium under Commitment 
  In this sub-section it is assumed that the government can credibly commit to repaying its 
domestic and external debt obligations in the second period. This solution will serve as the 
benchmark case.  
 
Proposition 1: Under precommitment, optimal domestic and foreign borrowing ensures 
expected distortion smoothing. Domestic and foreign interest rates will be equalized. 
 
Optimal government borrowing attempts to smooth tax distortions subject to the budget 
constraints.20 The government’s problem is to maximize 
 
                                                  
17 The case with default is dealt with in section 5. 
18 I assume that there are no market imperfections other than those caused by the government’s need to raise 
revenues. 
19 An important assumption is that the distortion in period i  does not depend on expected future tax collections. 
20 Sargent (2000) highlights the isomorphism between consumption-smoothing models and tax -smoothing models. 
He shows that every issue in the consumption smoothing models surfaces in a corresponding tax smoothing model.        
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) ( ) ( 2 1 , 1 1
G - G - W W Max
F B d         1 0 < <d                    (7) 
 
subject to the following period 1 and period 2 constraints, respectively: 
 
1 1 1 1 F B G - - = T                        (8) 
 
2 1 1 2 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( G B r F r b f + + + + = T                    (9) 
 
Since government bonds are the only saving vehicle, domestic capital market equilibrium 
requires that the private agent’s financial wealth equal the government’s domestic debt (in per 
capita terms), that is   1 1 B S = , which implies that  
 
  ) ( 1 1 1 1 1 G - - T - = W C Y B                              (10) 
 
The government will internalize domestic and foreign creditors’ reaction functions while making 
its optimal policy announcement. Under precommitment, domestic creditors will solve the 
program (1) – (4). Foreign investors will solve the program (6) – (6.2). The assumption of 
competitive risk-neutral international investors implies that in equilibrium the interest rate on 
external debt must be equal to the risk free international interest rate, that is, 
* r rf = . 
 
  Internalizing the reaction of investors, the government maximizes its objective function 
in (7) subject to constraints (8) and (9). Also, there is an external debt constraint, ] , [ 1 1 1 Y B f F £ , 
which depends on the level of domestic debt as well as the first period GDP. This constraint 
simply specifies that the sovereign will not choose to repudiate on its external debt. As long as 
the external debt constraint is not binding, the first order conditions for this maximization 
problem yield the following:   
   
     ) ( ' ) 1 ( ) ( ' 2 1 G + = G EW r W b d                                         (11) 
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and      f b r r =  
 
Equation (11) determines the optimal fiscal policy in terms of taxes and government borrowing. 
Taxes are smoothed over time through public debt issuance, in a path that slopes according to the 
relative magnitudes of  d  and  b r . In addition, as long as the external debt constraint is not 
binding, domestic and world interest rates are equal. The government will borrow up to the point 
where the cost of borrowing in domestic and foreign markets is equalized. 
21 
 
5. Incentive Problems and Selective Default 
  We now consider the case where the government can no longer credibly commit to 
repaying its debt obligations in every possible state of nature in the second period. Under certain 
parameter combinations, and for certain values of the state variables, it is possible that the 
sovereign chooses to default rather than honoring its debt obligations. In this setup, debt 
contracts are not enforceable as the sovereign can choose to default on its debt contracts if it 
finds it optimal to do so. As described in the previous section, the country can borrow in both 
domestic and external markets. A key characteristic of the model is the possibility of default on 
both domestic and external debt. In the context of sovereign debt, it is important to distinguish 
between a domestic creditor and a foreign creditor, since both might have different possibilities 
to sanction a government that is unwilling (or unable) to repay. We assume that the identity of 
debt holders can be observed once the debt is issued. This allows for the possibility of segmented 
markets in which the government can selectively default on one class of its obligations (i.e. 
domestic or foreign). 
 
For simplicity, output in the first period is normalized to 1. In the second period, the 
economy receives stochastic exogenous endowment 2 y , which is the realization of the random 
variable  ] , [ : y y Y . The cumulative distribution function of  2 Y is  ) ( 2 y F and the density function 
is ) ( 2 y f . It is assumed that 0 > y . Throughout this section, we will assume that there is a 
benevolent government whose objective function is to minimize the excess burden of 
                                                  
21 When the external debt constraint becomes binding the domestic interest rate will jump. This change in the 
domestic interest rate will reflect the need for the sovereign to rely (marginally) only on domestic finance.         
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distortionary taxes, and it can selectively default on one class of bondholders. The aim of this 
sub-section is to characterize the optimal debt structure chosen by the sovereign in the first 
period.    
 
The sequence of events in the model is as follows. Loans are taken out at the beginning of 
the first period (to augment period 1 government spending) and are repaid with interest at the 
beginning of the second period. Suppose the sovereign borrows an amount 1 F , at a contractual 
interest rate  f r , in foreign capital markets and an amount  1 B , at a contractual interest rate  b r , 
from domestic residents in the first period. At the beginning of the second period, output is 
realized and is observed by all the participants in the economy: domestic creditors, foreign 
creditors and the government. After the output is realized, the debtor decides whether to default 
or not (and on what class of obligations to default on). If a bad shock is realized in period 2, 
default occurs. Default is defined as any failure to meet contractually stated obligations on time 
and in full.  In case of default, a penalty is inflicted upon the borrowing country.  
 
Default costs are modeled as a fraction of output  2 y l . Following Bolton and Jeanne 
(2005)
22, this default cost can be decomposed into two components: 
 
  2 2 2 y y y b a l + =  
 
The first component is a deadweight cost that the country must bear when it defaults on its debt 
obligations. It can be interpreted as a reputational cost of default, or output loss resulting from a 
banking crisis or capital flight. The second component is a sanction that foreign creditors impose 
on the defaulting country (for example, the output loss resulting from litigation by creditors in 
foreign countries, or from trade sanctions). If the sovereign defaults on its domestic debt 
obligations, it only bears the deadweight cost,  2 y a . Thus, defaulting on either type of debt results 
in payment of the deadweight cost,  2 y a , while sanctions  2 y b are imposed only if the sovereign 
defaults on its external debt obligations. The assumption that default may reduce output can be 
                                                  
22 The modeling of default costs is similar to that used by Bolton and Jeanne (2005) to analyze the moral hazard 
problem associated with debt dilution. The emphasis here, however, is quite different and focuses on the features of 
domestic and external borrowing.        
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rationalized by the common view that after default there is a disruption in the countries’ ability to 
engage in international trade, which in turn reduces the value of output (Rose, 2002; Cole and 
Kehoe, 2000; Bulow and Rogoff, 1989). Also, Sturzenegger (2002), in a study of defaults in the 
1980s, finds evidence of a 4 percent cumulative drop in output over the 4 years immediately 
following a default.  
 
Several points are worth noting about the penalty structure utilized in this model. First, 
this formulation attempts to capture in a simple way the fact that domestic and foreign creditors 
have different ways of punishing the government. Second, since the investors’ punishment is 
independent of the magnitude of the default, it is optimal for the government to repudiate the 
entire stock of debt. Third, following Bolton and Jeanne (2005), we assume that the only way 
that the sovereign discriminates between different classes of creditors is through selective 
default.
23 Although this assumption precludes the more realistic possibility of the sovereign 
negotiating with both types of creditors simultaneously, it allows us to focus on the implications 
of unequal creditor treatment for the ex ante equilibrium of the debt market.  
 
5.1 Default Decisions 
To define equilibrium in this framework, we solve the model backwards, starting from 
period 2. We determine the repayment and default decisions of the sovereign, taking the stock of 
domestic ( 1 B ) and external debt ( 1 F ) as given. In period 2, there are three possible scenarios  
faced by the sovereign: 
(i) Fully repay both domestic and external debt; 
(ii) Selective default on either kind of debt; or 
(iii) Default on both kinds of debt. 
 
If the sovereign defaults on its external debt obligations it receives a payoff of  1 2 ) 1 ( B R y b - -l . 
On the other hand, if it defaults on both its domestic and foreign debt its payoff will be given 
                                                  
23 Although the focus of their analysis is on renegotiable and non-renegotiable debt. Bolton and Jeanne (2005) 
simplify the situation in the extreme by assuming that ‘non-renegotiable’ debt is impossible to restructure. This 
assumption then implies that debt restructuring, if it occurs, involves renegotiable debt only. Although it would be 
more realistic to let the sovereign negotiate simultaneously with both types of creditors, such a model of trilateral 
bargaining is far from straightforward.         
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by 2 ) 1 ( y l - . This implies that for the sovereign, selective default on foreign debt is 
unambiguously dominated by full default. Thus, either the government defaults on both kinds of 
debt obligations, or defaults selectively on domestic debt. The case of selective default on 
foreign debt can effectively be ruled out. Intuitively, once the government has incurred the 
reputational cost of default and paid the sanctions, it has no incentive to make any payments to 
its domestic creditors. 
 
Let  1 B Rb and  1 F R f  be the repayment due on domestic and external debt in period 2, 
respectively.
24 Whether default takes place for a given value of  2 y  depends on whether 
) ( 1 1 F R B R f b + is greater than  2 y l  for that value of  2 y . We can partition the range of 2 y in an 
interval where this will be the case and in an interval where it will not. If the country defaults on 
both kinds of debt it suffers a loss of  2 y l . So if  2 1 1 y F R B R f b l £ +  the country fully repays the 
two types of debt. If, on the other hand,  2 1 1 y F R B R f b l > +  we have the following two scenarios 
to consider:  First, if  2 1 y F R f b > the country will default on both kinds of debt which costs 2 y l . 
This is less costly than a partial default on domestic debt which would cost  2 2 1 y y F R f l a > + . 
Second, if  2 1 y F R f b £  the government defaults on its domestic debt obligations. We assume that 
the government prefers a partial default on its domestic debt to a full default.  
 






1 F R B R
y
F R f b f +
< £  
 
This is possible only if  
l b
1 1 1 F R B R F R f b f +
< , which in turn requires that 
     
                                                  
24 Thus,  b R and  f R are the contractual interest factors on domestic and external debt, respectively.        
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a b
1 1 B R F R
b f <      
                    
If this condition is not satisfied, there are only two other cases possible: 
(i)  2 1 1 y F R B R f b l £ +  and the government repays all its debts, and 
(ii)  2 1 1 y F R B R f b l > +  and the government defaults on both domestic and foreign debt 
obligations and incurs a penalty of  2 y l . 
 
Proposition 2 The sovereign’s period 2 repayment strategy is as follows: 
 
(a) Full repayment: If  2
1 1 y
F R B R f b £
+
l
 the country fully repays its domestic and foreign 
debt. 
 




1 F R B R
y
F R f b f +
< £  the country defaults on its domestic 
debt and repays its foreign debt in full. 
 




 the country defaults on both domestic and external debt.  
 
Proof: See discussion above. ¦   
 




1 F R f  
l
1 1 F R B R f b +
  y  
default on 
both 
default on domestic and 
repay foreign 
repay 
both        
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Proposition 1 implies that bonds held by external creditors are effectively senior to bonds held by 
domestic creditors. In the case of partial default, the allocation of repayment between external 
and domestic bondholders is as if the former enjoyed strict seniority over the latter. This 
effective seniority would in turn imply that external bondholders should have a higher expected 
recovery ratio than domestic bondholders. Thus, we would expect the interest rate spread on 
external bonds to be lower than that on domestically placed bonds.  
 
5.2 Foreign Creditors 





























f                            (12) 
 
The probability of default on external debt is given by  
 









dy y f y F                              (13) 
 
The probability of default on external debt is a function of the state of the economy in the second 
period. It is a function of the stock of external debt  1 F  and the level of endowment 2 y . The 
probability of default is increasing in the stock of external debt as more debt implies a wider 
range of endowment realizations for which the sovereign prefers to default.25 
 
 
                                                  
25 To see this, let 
b
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Under ‘no commitment,’ the maximization problem of the foreign investors can be characterized 
as follows: 













c u E c u U Max
F x c c
d + =                            (14) 
subject to 






1 F x a c - - =                             (15.1) 





2 ) 1 )( 1 ( ) 1 ( F r x r c f




i c  denotes the consumption of foreign investors in period  i.  i F  and  
*
i x  denote the 
international investor’s holdings of government bonds and risk-free international assets in period  
i, respectively. The first order conditions for this problem imply 
 
    )} , ( )] , ( 1 ){[ 1 ( ) 1 ( 2 1 1 2 1
*




f p p - - + = +                     (15.3) 
 
Proposition 3: In the presence of default risk, foreign bonds will exhibit a positive interest 
spread. The spread is a function of the state variables of the model economy.  
 
Proposition 3 follows directly from equations (13) and (15.3). 
 
If there are no sovereign risk considerations, then competition among lenders will imply
* r rf = . 






dy y f  is positive, the interest rate charged on the 
sovereign’s external debt will be higher than the international risk-free rate, i.e. 
* r rf > , since 
international investors must now be compensated for the possibility of debt repudiation. Thus, 
under no commitment the stock of external debt will differ from that under precommitment, as 
shown by equation (15.3). This is due to the term associated with the probability of default, and 
the term associated with the effect on the probability of default of a unit increase in the stock of 
foreign debt.         
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The assumption of competitive risk-neutral international investors implies that in 
equilibrium the interest rate on government debt should be such that it yields an expected return 
equal to the risk-free return, 
   
} { ) 1 ( 2 1
* f P E F r = +                      (16) 
 
From expression (16) and the fact that the borrower repudiates whenever  2 1 y F R f b ‡ , we have 
{ } 2 2 1 *) 1 ( y P E F r
f b £ = + . Therefore, the maximum amount that foreign creditors are willing to 








£ b                                  (17) 
 
Thus, the higher the costs of the penalty, the higher is the credit ceiling. For each additional 




 additional dollars of foreign debt  1 F . Given 
tax obligations of domestic residents, foreign lenders can restrict loan amounts to ensure that 
repayment is in the borrower’s interest.  
 
5.3 Domestic Creditors 
  The government can no longer commit to fulfilling its domestic debt obligations in all 
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b                          (18) 
   
The probability of default on domestic debt can be written as  
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1 1
) ( ) , , (




dy y f y F B p                            (19) 
 
It is a function of the total stock of debt  ) ( 1 1 F B +  and the level of endowment 2 y .26 
 
The representative consumer maximizes the following intertemporal utility function:   
 
    [ ] ￿
=
G - + =
2
1
1 - i ) ( ) ( ) (
i
i i i W G v C u U d                            (20) 
 
with respect to  1 C  and  2 C . The maximization problem is subject to the following budget 
constraints: 
1 1 1 1 1 ) ( S W y C - G - G - =                           (21.1) 
 
    ) ( ) 1 )]( ; , ( 1 [ 2 2 2 1 2 1 1 2 G - G - + + - = W y S r y F B p C b
d                     (21.2) 
 
 
The first order conditions imply the following equation: 
 
    ) ( ' )] , , ( 1 )[ 1 ( ) ( ' 2 2 1 1 1 C u y F B p r E C u
d
b - + = d                                                        (22) 
 
This is the standard Euler equation adjusted for the risk of default.  
 
 
                                                  
26 The probability of default on domestic debt is an increasing function of the stock of total debt.  To see this, let  
l
1 1 ˆ
F R B R
y
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= . Then from (19), 
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5.4 Equilibrium Borrowing with Selective Default 
In the first period, the government can choose between various combinations of taxes, 
and domestic and external borrowing to finance its fiscal outlays. In the second period only taxes 
are available to finance both debt repayments and expenditure on the public good. For simplicity, 
the initial outstanding domestic and external debt is assumed to be zero. The government’s 
budget constraint in periods 1 and 2 can now be written as 
     
1 1 1 1 F B G - - = G                                (23) 
 
2 2 2 2 G P P
b f + + = G                                          (24) 
 
where, 
f P 2  and 




The optimal taxation literature suggests that governments could improve welfare if they 
used debt management to reduce unexpected fluctuations in the tax rate. Changes in taxation are 
costly because the welfare loss from taxation rises more than proportionately with changes in the 
tax rate. A benevolent government will thus try to equalize the marginal social cost of taxation 
across dates and states of nature. However, in the presence of shocks to spending and output, 
taxes will need to change over time in order to maintain fiscal solvency. Theoretically, the 
government could keep the tax rate constant if it could hedge against the impact of shocks on its 
finances by issuing state-contingent debt. In such a case, the effect of any shock could be 
completely offset by changes in debt servicing costs. However, governments usually do not issue 
state-contingent debt. In reality, returns on government debt are never state contingent except 
through the possibility of default when the economy is hit by a bad shock. The debt contract with 
default can be viewed as a special form of the public debt contracts with state-contingent 
returns.
28  
                                                  
27  f P 2 and b P 2 are as defined in equation (12) and (18), respectively, and denote the realized returns i.e. inclusive of 
any repudiation. 
28 Public debt contracts with state-contingent returns were analyzed in Chari, Christiano and Kehoe (1994), and 
discussed in Barro (1995).        
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It is worth emphasizing here that markets in this setup are incomplete, as not only is there 
an endogenous default risk, but the set of assets available to the economy are not sufficient to 
insure away the idiosyncratic shocks to endowment. The option of defaulting brings partial state 
contingency to the economy. In the absence of any contract enforcement mechanism in the 
model economy, the sovereign can decide whether to repay its debts or to default (selectively or 
in full). Thus, in this sense default has a state-contingent (i.e. insurance) mechanism which 
would be absent from a risk-free bond.   
 
As described earlier, taxes are distortionary and the government minimizes the distortion 
from taxation by allocating taxes over time. The second period output is subject to stochastic 
disturbances. Shocks to the economy generally require unexpected changes in the path of taxes. 
Good states of nature allow for tax cuts and bad states require tax increases. Thus, the cost of 
taxation also varies with the state of nature- raising taxes being more costly in the bad states of 
nature. Because the welfare losses from taxation increase more than linearly with changes in 
taxes, the total loss from raising taxes in one period and then lowering them in the next period 
will tend to be higher than if taxes were the same over both periods (for a given total amount of 
taxation over the two periods). Thus, optimal government borrowing attempts to smooth tax 
distortions subject to the budget constraints. The government’s problem is to maximize  
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which can also be written as        
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y
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d                        (26) 
 
The first term in equation (26) captures the first period welfare gain associated with funding one 
unit of fiscal expenditure by foreign borrowing instead of raising taxes. The second expression is 
the expected deadweight loss in the second period that comes from having to raise future taxes to 
repay external debt. 
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= d , then 
equation (27) implies tax smoothing over time  ( ) 1 2 t t E = , as in Barro (1979). Thus, optimal 
foreign borrowing ensures distortion smoothing between period 1 and the states of nature in 
period 2 in which full repayment occurs. 
 
The first order condition for optimal domestic borrowing is given by 
 
0 ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) (
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y
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d                 (28)  
 
The first term in equation (28) captures the first period welfare gain associated with funding one 
unit of fiscal expenditure through domestic borrowing instead of raising taxes. The second        
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expression represents the expected deadweight loss in the second period that comes from having 
to raise future taxes to repay domestic debt obligations.  
 
The optimal allocation of debt between domestic and foreign creditors can thus be 
viewed as the government’s purchase of insurance. The presence of both domestic and external 
debt facilitates intertemporal consumption smoothing in the event of default. The option of 
defaulting on domestic debt in the second period, and thus not having to raise taxes, will help 
cushion the fall in second-period consumption should a bad shock trigger default. A bad shock in 
the second period reduces output and triggers default. These are also the states of nature where 
the marginal cost of public funds is high. Thus, when tax collection is costly, the government can 
strategically default on only one class of its obligations in order to minimize the excess burden of 
distortionary taxes. A country characterized by volatile output, tax collection costs and sovereign 
risk will thus want to borrow in domestic markets as well as in international capital markets. 
 
6. Conclusions and Implications 
  The outstanding volume of domestic debt issued by emerging markets has increased 
significantly relative to international debt in recent years. The increasing significance of public 
sector bonds issued in domestic markets argues for the importance of analyzing the 
considerations that affect a government’s decision to borrow from home or abroad. Furthermore, 
emerging markets have defaulted on both domestic and foreign debt in recent years. Countries 
have also defaulted differentially on domestic and foreign debt, and even on different types of 
debt within these two classes. Standard economic models of sovereign debt mainly focus on how 
the actions of foreign creditors influence the default decisions of sovereigns, either through 
increased reputational costs or trade sanctions. Very little attention has been paid to the response 
of domestic creditors, or to the relative standing of the two classes of creditors.  In contrast to 
this one-sided focus, this paper adds to a new theoretical literature that points at the possibility of 
default on domestic debt and the ability of domestic creditors to punish the sovereign.  
 
The model presented in this paper introduces a distinction between domestic and external 
borrowing, and focuses on the problem of raising domestic revenue in order to service debt 
obligations. We allow for the possibility of default on both domestic and foreign debt, and        
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default is costly. The two classes of creditors are assumed to have different abilities to punish the 
government in the event of default, and this in turn creates a gap in the expected default costs to 
the sovereign and hence a differential in its propensity to default on its domestic versus foreign 
debt.  
 
  The motivation for debt management in this paper is to minimize the welfare losses 
arising from distortionary taxation. Optimal government borrowing attempts to smooth tax 
distortions. Results show that the presence of both foreign and domestic debt facilitates inter-
temporal consumption smoothing in the event of default. The option of defaulting on domestic 
debt helps cushion the fall in consumption in the second period. Thus, in the presence of 
distortionary taxation, the sovereign can strategically default on one class of creditors in order to 
minimize the excess burden of taxes. 
 
  This research highlights two key practical lessons for policymakers in the realm of 
international finance. First, the results from this research and the case studies discussed make it 
clear that when governments run out of money they often treat domestic and foreign creditors 
differently. Despite important concerns about inter-creditor equity, the ability to treat domestic 
and foreign creditors differently can be seen as a policy option for governments in financial 
crisis. One possible way of dealing with this would be a sovereign bankruptcy regime capable of 
ensuring equal treatment among identical debt instruments. 
29 Admittedly, this is difficult to say 
the least. Second, the significant increase in the volume of domestic debt issued by emerging 
market entities relative to international debt calls for a new way of framing the core issues that 
arise in financial crises. An in-depth assessment of risk and fiscal sustainability must be based on 







                                                  
29 See, for example, Bolton and Skeel (2004), and Gelpern and Setser (2004).        
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